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IS Perspective of Research Issues in Electronic Commerce and Online
Auctions
Ravi Bapna, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, rbapna@cba.neu.edu
Abstract
Online auctions represent a model for the way the
Internet is shaping the new economy. In the absence of
spatial, temporal and geographic constraints these
mechanisms provide many benefits to both buyers and
sellers. However, significant research is still needed in
designing new and better mechanisms, as well as
examining the efficacy of existing ones in the contexts of
the markets they serve. Issues of mechanism design,
secondary market creation, incentive compatibility, bid
taker cheating, simultaneous substitutability, and
associated research methodologies are discussed in this
review paper. Interestingly, one finds a new and
potentially insightful research methodology standard
being adopted by IS researchers delving into the area of
online auctions. This involves quasi-analytical modeling
that is subsequently validated by empirical investigation
using data collected by automated agents which track
real-world web auctions.
Introduction
Online auctions conducted on the World Wide
Web represent an exciting phenomenon that encapsulates
many of the interesting aspects of the new economy. In
consumer oriented markets they offer a dynamic pricing
alternative to the age-old posted pricing mechanism.
Consumers can now experience the thrill of ‘winning’ a
product, potentially at a bargain, as opposed to the
typically more tedious notion of ‘buying’ it. For sellers
these mechanisms bring access to newer markets, help
clear aging or perishable inventory, and provide
experiential and at times viral marketing capabilities.
Additionally, the creation of hugely popular
consumer-to-consumer online auction sites like eBay has
resulted in dramatically improving the efficiency of
secondary markets that were typically associated with
garage sales and flea markets. Ebay’s legion of 10 million
monthly visitors provides the necessary critical mass of
buyers and sellers to set market prices for their goods.
The more bids that come in, the more competition there
is, and chances are that higher the price.
The impact is even more dramatic in business-to-
business (B2B) markets where Forrester Research
predicts an increase in sales from $19.3 billion last year to
$52.6 billion by 2002. A full suite of dynamic pricing
mechanisms is in use here including standard auctions
where there is a single seller and multiple buyers, reverse
auctions where a single buyer receives bids from multiple
sellers and multiple buyer, multiple seller exchanges that
resemble the bid-ask markets for stocks and commodities.
Mollman (2000) presents an overview of the top
performing B2B auctions.
Despite the enormous volume of activity on the
web there are many unanswered questions pertaining to
the design of such auctions.
Mechanism Design
While there exists a vast body of literature that
covers much of traditional auction theory, it is becoming
increasingly evident that many of the well-established
results and assumptions do not hold in the online settings.
Myerson (1981) and Bulow and Roberts (1989) describe
the most important of these results, namely the theorem of
revenue equivalence. This states that if the winner under
one type of auction (say an English auction) is also the
winner under a second type of auction (say a Dutch
Auction), than the two auctions will yield the same
expected revenue. While this result has been found to
robust for auctions of single items, Bapna, Goes and
Gupta (2000a) observe that a majority of B2C online
auctions are multi-item auctions of identical goods. They
were the first to use automated software agent technology
to capture live data from real world auctions in the
process adding a new methodological dimension to
auction theory research.
Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) point out that
single-item results do not carry over into multiple-item
settings and that this has been a vastly neglected area of
auction theory research. The extension of the revenue
equivalence result to the online setting of multi-item
auctions is an interesting area of research from the
perspective of which mechanism should be adopted under
what circumstance. For instance if there is a pre-
dominance of risk-averse bidders who prefer a certain
outcome to an uncertain one, than would a descending
Dutch auction yield higher expected revenue? Of course,
this analysis is not trivial even with the most simplistic of
assumptions regarding the consumer type.
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 Incentive Compatibility
Another socially desirable property in any
market mechanism is the issue of incentive compatibility.
This indicates whether the mechanism provides the
incentives for the truthful revelation of one’s valuations,
and whether such a strategy is a dominant one. One such
mechanism proposed by Vickrey (1961) is the second-
price auction which is a sealed-bid equivalent of open
English auctions. In the Vickrey auction the highest
bidder wins but pays the price of the second-highest bid.
In such auctions the bidders’ dominant strategy is to
reveal her true valuation, as   there is no incentive to bid
higher than the true valuation since the bidder might be
last person to receive the item at a price higher than her
true valuations if someone else bids lower than her bid but
higher than her true valuation. Examining the incentive
compatibility property of the various online auction
mechanisms being adopted promises to be a fruitful area
of investigation.
Bapna, Goes and Gupta, 2000a emphasize the
importance of the bid increment on the revenue
generation in a multi-item auction. They stress on the
hitherto ignored discrete and sequential nature of the
equilibrium structure of these multi-item auction
mechanisms. In a  related paper (Bapna, Goes and Gupta,
2000b) uses online auction data to explore and refute
some common assumptions about online auction behavior
found in the economics literature. In particular they
empirically identify three different bidding strategies
employed by bidders and find a significant difference in
the surplus extracted by adopters of these strategies.
Bid Taker Cheating, Trust and Feedback
Ratings
Another reason a given auction mechanism may
be socially preferable over another is the potential for (or
lack of) opportunistic behavior amongst sellers. Kauffman
and Wood (2000) present an analytical model and provide
empirical evidence of ‘questionable bidding behavior’ by
sellers on eBay.  Pavlou and Ba (2000) recognize that
trust is an essential component of online auctions, and that
buyers pay a price premium to transact with reputable
sellers, particularly for expensive products. Both these
papers attempt to model important aspects of trust and
reputation in online auctions and rely on analytical
modeling backed up empirical investigation using
automated agents to capture real-world auctions. This is
an important area of research as it addresses many of the
issues raised by the critics of online auctions and helps
formalize the concept and measurement of trust and
reputation of sellers.
Auctions v. Posted Price
Another promising stream of IS research in the area of
dynamic pricing deals with comparing auctions with
posted price mechanisms for the sale of identical goods.
Seidmann and Vakrat (1999) compared online catalog
prices with online auction prices. They obtained data from
473 online auctions, such as SurplusAuction
(www.surplusauction.com) and OnSale.Com
(www.onsale.com). They compared prices received in
these auctions with prices from Internet catalog sellers,
such as Egghead (www.egghead.com) and
PriceScan.Com (www.pricescan.com). Their data analysis
revealed that consumers expect greater discounts for more
expensive items. In their studies, Seidmann and Vakrat
employed Internet agents as a data collection tool. Using a
similar methodological approach Lee and Mehta (1999)
investigated the existence of winner's curse using
theoretical modeling and empirical validation. Their
preliminary results confirm the existence of the winners’
curse in electronic auction. The amount overbid is
especially pronounced for items where potential
information asymmetries exist as a result of the nature of
the product, and it is further augmented in cases where the
product is relatively new and not much information
regarding it exists in the retail channels
A New IS Research Methodology
The above review indicates an interesting
commonality in the emerging IS literature in the area of
online auctions. The commonality is the utilization of an
analytical modeling approach that is subsequently
validated against real world data obtained using
intelligent agents that scour the web. By leveraging their
technological capabilities IS researchers who are
interested in economic issues are adding an insightful new
dimension to vast body of economics literature that deals
with auctions.
In contrast to the traditional economics literature
that is perhaps unconsciously constrained by the physical
limitations of traditional auctions, the emerging IS
perspective on online auctions has been to model these
auctions in the broader context of the markets in which
such auctions take place. Without the physical constraints
of traditional auctions the behavior of the different
economic agents in auctions is heavily influenced by the
(online) context in which they take place. For instance,
the presence of simultaneous substitutable online auctions
- which allows an individual shopping for, say a
computer, to simultaneously bid at Onsale.com or
Yahoo.com - impacts the efficiency of not just the isolated
auction under consideration but also the external market
in which it takes place. Auction portals like
www.biddersedge.com are specifically designed to make
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tracking such simultaneous substitutable online auctions
easy for the consumer.
I firmly believe that the emerging IS research
perspective and approach has high inductive value and
will lead to a significant enhancement to the body of
knowledge dealing with dynamic pricing and auctions.
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